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HELLMAN v. COLLIER
Qualifications For Members Of Congress -
Not Subject To State Control
Helman v. Collier'
The petitioner brought a mandamus proceeding against
the Secretary of State of Maryland to compel him to certify
to the Board of Supervisors of Elections for Baltimore City
the petitioner's candidacy for nomination to the House of
Representatives of the United States. The Secretary had
refused such certification on the ground that the petitioner
was not a resident of the district from which he sought
election. The lower court entered an order adverse to the
Secretary, who now appeals. On appeal the decision was
affirmed, the Court of Appeals holding that the Maryland
statutory2 provision that every candidate for election to
the United States House of Representatives shall be a resi-
dent of the congressional district in which he seeks election
contravened the sections of the Federal Constitution which
set forth the qualifications for a member of the House of
Representatives and was therefore unconstitutional and
void.
The states by virtue of the Constitution are allowed to
prescribe the time, place and manner of holding elections
for their Representatives, but Congress reserves the right
to alter these regulations or make new ones.3 Pursuant to
this authority Congress provided in 1842,' for the election
of Representatives by districts to secure fair representation
of the states in the House and to allow the House to de-
termine whether the states have properly fulfilled their
responsibility. 5 When this statute was passed, the majority
of the states were already selecting their representatives
by districts; since that time legislation has occasionally
been enacted concerning congressional districts. The pres-
ent statute established an automatic, but discretionary, re-
apportionment procedure to reflect population changes
when necessary.6
In 1807, the existing statute law in Maryland required
that one of the two members of the State's fifth congres-
1217 Md. 93, 141 A. 2d 908 (1958).
23 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 33, §158(c).
8 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §4, C1. 1.
'5 Stat. 491 (1842). Of. 2 U.S.C.A. (1927) §3.
'Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).
-2 U.S.C.A. (1958) §§2a, 2b.
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sional district live in Baltimore City as a condition to elec-
tion to the House of Representatives. In that year a dispute
arose as to the lawful residence of one of the two persons
receiving the highest vote; the House Committee reviewed
the situation and issued a report declaring the Maryland
law unconstitutional. This report caused strong debate,
but was not adopted, and the matter was settled by a simple
resolution of the House seating the original victor who did
not so reside. This was done without indication whether
the Maryland statute was constitutional or not. However
in 1856, Congress decided that the states could not impose
additional restrictions on the qualifications of their mem-
bers.7
The Constitution of the United States fixes the qualifi-
cations for members of Congress.8 To be eligible for elec-
tion to the House of Representatives, a person shall have
attained the age of 25, have been a citizen of the United
States for 7 years, and, at the time of his election, an in-
habitant of the state from which he is chosen.9 These quali-
fications are exclusive" and state constitutions or statutes
can neither add to nor detract from them. 1 However, these
qualifications are "subject, ... to reasonable provisions of
time and method of getting a candidate's name upon the
ballot."' 2 The requisites prescribed in the Constitution,
alone, determine eligibility for office,'3 and as a result, one
will not be disqualified by state constitutional and statu-
tory provisions which would make one, otherwise eligible,
ineligible for public office. This applies to prohibitions in-
tended to bar persons who: have been convicted of fel-
onies, 14 are subversive persons, 5 are known Communists, 8
are candidates that have been defeated in the state primary
elections for state office,'1 or were holders of certain state
'CLARKE AND HALL, DIGEST OF CONTESTED ELECrION CASES (1834) 167-221.
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §§2, 3. See State v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.
2d 89 (1942).
9 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §2, Ci. 2.
10 Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A. 2d 332 (1950).
u Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138, 106 P. 2d 328 (1940).
Shub v. Simpson, supra, n. 10, 198.
In Re O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 758 (1940).
State v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 219, 167 N.W. 481 (1918).
Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177. 76 A. 2d 332 (1950).
"In Re O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S. 24 758 (1940).
'¢ State v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W. 2d 89 (1942). Cf. State v. Swan-
son, 127 Neb. 806, 257 N.W. 255 (1934), where the court held that as such
a person could be a candidate. and elected by write-in vote, even though
he could not have his name on the published ballot, the statute was con-
stitutional.
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offices made ineligible by state law to hold public office
during their term."8
If the states were allowed to add to or vary the qualifi-
cations of Representatives in Congress, they would, in
essence, be determining the prerequisites for federal office.
Logically, states may make rules and determine qualifica-
tions for their own officers, but it has been held that a
Representative is an officer of the Federal government and
not of his state.1" Aside from the oath to support the Con-
stitution which is taken by all members20 and the power of
each House to determine the qualifications of its members,2
there appears to be nothing more specific which would
preclude a member of Congress from being a person whose
ideas are adverse to basic American precepts, yet one who
still upholds the Constitution in his own manner. If that
is to be a disqualification of a Representative it must be
determined by Congress, or by constitutional amendment,
and not by a state legislature or a state court.22
SANFORD A. MESKIN*
Presence Of Accused At Trial Necessary-
Kidnapping And False Imprisonment Differentiated
Midgett v. State'
On January 16, 1957, the defendant and two others
while parked behind the main office of a Baltimore restau-
rant, which they intended to rob, were surprised by a police
patrol car. While the officer was inquiring as to the defen-
dant's business in the alley, one of the defendant's compan-
ions drew a pistol and forced the officer to hand over his
service revolver, belt, holster and flashlight. The officer was
then placed in the defendant's car, driven ten miles out
of the city and left tied to a tree. All of the officer's equip-
'8Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Or. 439, 30 P. 2d 1037 (1,34) : State v.
Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W. 2d 504 (1946).
iDLamar v. U.S., 241 U.S. 103 (1916).
'*U.S. CONST. Art. 6, Cl. 3.
2U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §5, Ci. 1.
1Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 196, 76 A. 2d 332 (1950).
* A student at Seton Hall School of Law.
1216 Md. 26, 139 A. 2d 209 (1958).
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